Japan Hits a 10th Record-Low Birth Year as South Korea's Fertility Rate Quietly Climbs

East Asia's demographic story split in two this year. On 26 February 2026, Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare reported that 705,809 babies were born in 2025 — a fall of 15,179, or roughly 2.1%, and the 10th consecutive record low since records began in 1899, according to Nikkei Asia. Days earlier, Statistics Korea reported the opposite: South Korea's total fertility rate rose to 0.80, up from 0.75 in 2024, per Xinhua.

The contrast matters because both countries are in the same demographic trap, and what happens in Seoul may preview what is possible — or not — for everyone else below replacement, including most of Europe.

Reading Japan's numbers

Japan's headline figure is preliminary and may be revised, but the direction is unmistakable. Births of 705,809 arrived against 1,605,654 deaths, producing a natural population decline of 899,845 in a single year, Nippon.com reports — roughly two deaths for every birth. Japan's total fertility rate sits near 1.15, far below the 2.1 needed to keep a population stable, and the country is firmly "super-aged," with more than 20% of people aged 65 or older, as Newsweek notes. The 2025 total fell below 706,000 more than 15 years ahead of an official 2023 projection — a reminder that decline can outrun even the gloomiest forecasts. The country's broader census tells the same story: preliminary 2025 data put Japan's population at about 123.05 million, down roughly 3.09 million in five years, the steepest fall on record. Each birth cohort that shrinks today narrows the pool of future parents, building decline into the math for decades.

Why Korea's uptick is real — but fragile

South Korea long held the title of the world's lowest fertility rate, bottoming at 0.72 in 2023. Its 2025 reading of 0.80 marks the second straight year of increase, with newborns up 6.8% to about 254,500 — the largest annual rise in deliveries in years. The driver, analysts say, is a rebound in marriages, which in Korea still strongly predicts childbearing, alongside more than a decade of aggressive pro-natal spending that has run into the hundreds of billions of dollars across both countries combined. Improved sentiment toward having children — after years in which young Koreans openly questioned whether family was affordable at all — appears to be feeding through into the numbers.

The gain came faster than the government's own projections. But two cautions apply. First, 0.80 is still catastrophically low: Korea's population is still shrinking, with 363,400 deaths against births in 2025 and a natural decline of 108,900. Second, a marriage rebound may be partly a timing effect — couples who delayed weddings during the pandemic catching up — which could fade. As CNN reported, the question is whether the trend can last.

The same drivers, the same stakes

Both governments and most demographers point to a familiar cluster of causes: expensive housing, punishing working hours, sky-high private education costs, and precarious youth employment that delays marriage and family formation. None is quickly fixable with cash incentives alone, which is why years of subsidies have moved the needle only modestly.

The stakes are economic as much as social. Shrinking working-age populations strain pension and health systems, slow growth, and shift the tax burden onto fewer young earners. It is against this backdrop that Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung agreed to launch a joint task force to share policy responses on birth rates and aging, Newsweek reports — a notable step between two neighbors with a fraught history.

Why Europe should pay attention

Europe is not East Asia, but it is also below replacement. The EU's fertility rate hovers around 1.4, and several members — Italy, Spain, Greece — sit closer to the East Asian range. The continent has so far leaned on immigration to offset natural decline, an option Japan and Korea have used far more sparingly. Korea's tentative rebound offers a live experiment in whether marriage-friendly and pro-natal policy can shift the curve; Japan offers a sobering picture of how hard reversal becomes once aging sets in. The policy questions are identical across continents: how to make housing attainable for young couples, how to reconcile careers with parenthood, and whether the state can credibly lower the perceived cost of raising a child. The fact that Tokyo and Seoul — not natural collaborators — see enough common ground to coordinate underscores how few proven answers exist.

What to watch next

Final 2025 figures from both countries are due later in 2026 and could revise these preliminary numbers. The key tests: whether Korea's rate holds or climbs again in 2026, whether its marriage surge proves durable rather than a post-pandemic catch-up, and whether the Japan–Korea task force produces shareable policy or remains symbolic. For now, the lesson is narrow but real — fertility declines are not necessarily one-way, but reversing them is slow, costly, and uncertain.